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An Analysis of Inflation in Scotland and the UK 
This article attempts to analyse the recent inflationary experience 
of the Scottish and UK economies. Unfortunately at the present time 
the lack of data on prices in Scotland has proved to be an almost 
complete deterrent to both study and discussion in this area, 
contrasting with the situation for the UK as a whole where an adequate 
supply of data has allowed the necessary analysis and debate. Thus, 
while information on comparative wage inflation rates is examined, 
the second section of the article is a largely qualitative analysis 
of the inflationary process in the Scottish economy. 
Research on inflation has changed radically over the last few years 
but the results of the new work are only now beginning to permeate 
public discussion. This article may help to disseminate this new 
information as well as to highlight the very real differences of 
opinion that exist. However, before discussing the modern current 
of inflation analysis it is worthwhile to consider the previous 
orthodoxy and the factors which produced the impetus for change. 
Section 1 
The mid sixties was a time of near unanimity among UK economists on 
the fundamental causes of inflation. The basic view was that the 
rate of wage inflation was determined by the amount of excess demand 
for labour, which was assumed to vary inversely with the level of 
unemployment - see the diagram below. 
Wage Inflation (%) 
0 
^__ 
Unemployment {%) 
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In other words, economists assumed that wages rose fastest during 
a boom, because firms then had to compete amongst themselves for 
what labour was available, and changed little under conditions of 
economic slump, when unemployment was high. By combining these 
ideas on wage inflation with the hypothesis that firms raise prices 
at a rate determined by the rate of wage increase minus the increase 
in labour productivity, two very simple conclusions emerged. First, 
there was a well-defined trade-off between inflation and unemployment: 
we could have either low unemployment £r low inflation, but not both. 
Phillips, whose name is associated with this relationship, suggested 
that the UK economy could choose either one percent unemployment with 
6% price inflation or just over 2% unemployment with a zero rate of 
price inflation (or some combination of these). Secondly, this 
overall view implied that inflation could be easily controlled by 
Keynesian demand management, as no one disputed the fact that 
unemployment could be influenced by conventional monetary and fiscal 
policies. Thus the rate of price inflation could be chosen according 
to political judgement. 
Towards the end of the decade, however, this theory became clearly 
untenable as both unemployment and wage and price inflation increased. 
This phenomenon, often termed 'stagflation', became apparent throughout 
most of the Western world over the late sixties and early seventies 
and the old orthodoxy had to be rejected. A number of theories have 
been proposed over the last few years in an attempt to develop a 
satisfactory explanation of inflation. It is convenient for the 
purpose of this article to distinguish between theories of wage 
inflation and theories of price inflation; the former will be examined 
first. 
Wage inflation theories 
While there are a myriad of particular theories they can be subsumed 
within three broad groups: 
(a) the expectations/excess demand theory 
(b) the trade unions strength, "wage push" theory 
(c) the sociological and political explanation 
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The first of these has its roots in work done in the late sixties 
by Friedman and Phelps, although the most notable British advocates 
are Professors Laidler and Parkin, who have refined and tested the 
basic argument. This view is normally, although not unambiguously, 
labelled "monetarism" because it is commonly combined with the 
argument that it is over-expansion of the money supply that has 
generated substantial excess demand. Groups (b) and (c) are closely 
related; the increased trade union strength theory has been proposed 
by Hines, Turner and Jackson et al, while Wiles and Hicks have been 
amongst those who have put forward theories based on the idea that 
non-economic factors are of crucial importance in explaining the 
recent wage and price 'explosion'. The article will now summarise 
and compare these three potential explanations of the recent wage 
inflation. 
The first of the theories is essentially an adapted version of the 
old Phillips curve orthodoxy. However, the extremely interesting 
addition to the theory is that of the new role for 'expectations'. 
The basic argument, as set out originally by Friedman, is that the 
rate of wage inflation is jointly determined by: 
(1) the amount of excess demand in the labour market 
(which can be proxied by the inverse of the 
unemployment level) 
(2) the expected rate of price inflation 
The rationale for the latter variable is both plausible and simple: 
workers are assumed to be concerned with the value of their real wages, 
hence if they believe that prices will rise 10% over the coming year 
they will demand 10% higher wages simply to maintain their standard 
of living. The theory assumes that the only other determinant of 
wage inflation is demand pressure in the labour market - excess demand 
produces an increase of more than 10%, while excess supply reduces the 
rate below 10%. 
This theory of wage inflation can be used to explain the recent 
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stagflation in the following way. First, so the argument runs, 
the whole inflationary spiral was begun by excessive expansion 
of world demand by the USA in the 1960's. The huge government 
expenditure programmes that the United States carried out at that 
time produced a large balance of payments deficit in that country 
while simultaneously increasing the level of demand pressure in 
the rest of the world. In Britain this inflationary impulse was 
reinforced by devaluation of the pound in 1967 and by expansionary 
monetary policy. This excess demand provided the original wage 
inflationary stimulus. However, as price inflation developed -
because wage costs were rising - people began to expect future 
increases in the price level. Because of this, workers began to 
build these expectations into their wage claims. This served to 
increase wage inflation, which produced still greater price 
inflation. By the 1970's, although unemployment was at a level 
which in the fifties would have meant a constant price level, a 
huge rate of inflation had been created by a wage-price spiral 
propelled by labour's reaction to its expectations of price inflation. 
In terms of diagram (1) proponents of this school suggest that the 
Phillips Curve shifted rightwards over the period because of 
expectations of high rates of price inflation and the compensatory 
increases in money wages that resulted. 
The advocates of this view believe that there is a straightforward, 
although politically unpopular, solution to the problem of 
inflation. If the government produces excess supply in the 
economy - that is, creates a recession - the level of wage 
inflation will be reduced over time (a) because higher unemployment 
will dampen wage increases as firms find that they do not have to 
compete for workers in a tight labour market, and (b) because as wage 
inflation moderates, the rate of price inflation will fall, hence 
reducing the rate of price inflation that workers expect. Thus the 
whole spiral can be put into reverse. The initial result of this type 
of demand management policy would be high unemployment, low wage and price 
inflation and a low expected rate of inflation. However, supporters 
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of this policy believe that once this situation has been attained 
it would be possible to reflate slowly without producing a high rate 
of inflation, eventually establishing the early sixties situation 
of moderately low unemployment with low inflation. To maintain 
this it would be necessary to avoid sharp increases in demand 
pressure, such as result from large increases in the supply of money. 
This constitutes the basic 'monetarist' position in the debate on 
inflation policy. 
The second of the three theories of wage inflation rests upon the 
premise that the cause of the recent wage explosion is increased 
trade union power. Underlying this thesis is the view that under 
existing conditions the level of wages is determined by the outcome 
of a bargaining process between unions and employers. Advocates 
of the trade union, "wage push" theory argue that trade unions are 
now highly organised and capable of forcing strikes for substantial 
periods of time. Because employers often take the view that they 
will be forced to pay higher wages eventually, or that it is simply 
more profitable to concede than to provoke a long and bitter strike, 
it has been argued that trade unions have, and now realise that they 
have, a great deal of power to extract high wage increases. To 
establish whether increased trade union strength has caused the 
recent inflationary experience is unfortunately difficult, 
particularly because it is not clear how the 'average level of trade 
union power' can be measured. However, this explanation of 
inflation seems to have wide popular support and probably forms the 
rationale for the many attempts at incomes policy in the UK over the 
last decade. The proponents of this view argue that demand 
management is of little use in combating inflation and that some sort 
of powerful policy of wage control is necessary. 
A related point that has been widely discussed is that government 
policy has helped unions extract higher wages. Given that a union 
is concerned about the number of its members who are unemployed there 
is a natural brake on excessive wage increases, because under static 
demand conditions most firms will cut back their labour force as the 
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wage rate increases; thus unions may be reluctant to press for 
very large wage rises. Many writers have claimed that the 
government's commitment to maintain high employment has prevented 
this natural device from operating. In short, unions have pressed 
for large wage increases, confident that the government would 
prevent unemployment by increasing aggregate demand. 
The third of the wage inflation theories contends that inflation has 
stemmed largely from sociological changes in the Western world. 
Theorists of this genre suggest the crucial points are that people 
now feel frustrated when their incomes fail to grow at a 'satisfactory' 
rate, that there is competition between groups of labour to widen 
wage differentials, and that people are now more selfish and 
materialistic than ever before. The common theme running through 
theories of this type is that the very nature of Western society has 
changed over the last decade and that the result has been a wage 
spiral. Unfortunately these ideas appear to be even less easily 
testable than those of the second type, which makes it extremely 
difficult to weigh them against the evidence put forward by those 
supporting alternative views. It is not obvious what policy action 
would be most appropriate if this were the correct explanation of 
inflation, but some form of incomes policy is presumably implied, 
particularly if supported by a publicity campaign aimed at changing 
attitudes in society; the £6 a week policy is of this type, to the 
extent that it is based on union acceptance of a fall in real wages. 
The preceding discussion constitutes a brief survey of the present 
controversies over the cause of wage inflation. To explain the 
price inflation that accompanied wage increases, however, it is 
necessary to consider briefly why prices have been continually 
raised over the last decade. 
Theories of Price Inflation 
The major debate in this area of economics is whether 
(a) prices change because of changes in both costs 
(of labour, raw materials and other factors of 
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production) and demand pressure 
or (b) prices are set merely with regard to costs, on a 
mark-up basis. 
While conventional economics suggest that firms attempt to maximise 
profits and therefore change prices if demand conditions alter, many 
writers have suggested that large sections of manufacturing industry 
merely apply some profit margin to costs in setting prices and thus 
raise prices only if costs increase. While this may be a reasonable 
description of some industrial sectors it seems likely that the 
general price level is affected by demand pressure as well as unit 
costs. This view is supported by the weight of the empirical 
evidence as well as by consideration of the fact that in certain 
sectors - such as the agricultural sector, for example, which has an 
important influence on the retail price index - demand conditions are 
vitally important in determining prices. In conclusion, price 
inflation can be produced by either rising costs (such as produced by 
rising wages) or excess demand for goods (which increases profit 
margins) or some combination of these. 
Conclusions on the Causes of Inflation 
Can some consistent overall conclusion on the causes of wage and price 
inflation be drawn from the academic theories outlined above? The 
view expressed here is that by combining certain aspects of these 
theories it is possible to reach a satisfactory explanation of the 
inflationary experience of the UK. Section 11 discusses the 
Scottish inflation using the same broad conclusions. 
The expectations/excess demand theory, which is in many ways the most 
clearly articulated and thoroughly researched of the theories, 
provides what is probably the most valuable and original insight from 
the three, namely that the expected rate of price inflation is a 
fundamental determinant of the rate of inflation. In addition, on 
theoretical and empirical grounds it does seem that demand conditions 
in the economy influence the rates of wage and price inflation. 
Thus the theory is, in the main, extremely convincing. However, 
the 'monetarists' have concentrated too heavily on the role of the 
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money supply as a determinant of aggregate demand in the economy; 
fiscal policy is also critically important. Even though this 
theory clearly contributes a great deal to our understanding of 
the causes of recent inflation it is not in itself a complete 
explanation. 
The crucial weakness in the excess demand expectations theory of 
inflation is that the process of bargaining between unions and 
management is ignored. It is simply assumed that if workers 
expect 20% price inflation they will claim, and receive, a 20% 
increase in wages, plus or minus some adjustment depending on 
whether boom conditions are forcing wages up or whether high 
unemployment is dampening wage inflation. This assertion -
based on the assumption that workers do not ever press for higher 
living standards or parity with other sectors - seems indefensible. 
As a result, the excess demand/expectations theory cannot explain 
why, for example, certain groups of labour, such as the coal miners, 
managed to extract much greater wage increases - with no signs of 
excess demand - than those given elsewhere in the economy; nor 
what produced wage inflation in 1974-75 so far above the rate of 
price inflation that the real incomes of wage and salary earners 
rose substantially during a slump; nor why the boom in the fifties 
(when unemployment fell as low as in the sixties) failed to produce 
the 20-30% inflation of the last few years. To explain these events 
it seems necessary to consider the factors proposed in the other two 
theories. The first point seems obviously to have resulted from 
the strong bargaining position of the NUM; the second indicates that 
workers both expect to receive, and can ensure that they receive, 
increases in real incomes every year; while the third point suggests 
that structural changes of the types postulated by the sociological 
and trade union push theories have occurred over the last two 
decades. 
In overall conclusion, the wage and price inflation experienced in the 
UK over the last 5-10 years can be largely explained in terms of over 
expansion of demand and the propulsive effects of a wage-price spiral 
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stemming from expectations of continuing price inflation. While this 
mechanism has been of major importance, however, it seems that changes in 
sociological factors and trade union strength have also played a part„ 
Although government action in attempting to maintain full employment has to 
some extent aided this "wage push" inflation, by largely removing the fear 
of unemployment as a result of substantial wage increases, it is not obvious 
that demand management alone could reduce inflation to a few percent without 
producing the sort of depression experienced in the 1930's„ The policy 
implications of this are that both deflation and some form of incomes policy -
aimed at reducing real income growth expectations in particular - are likely 
to be necessary to control UK inflation., This suggests that present 
government policy may accomplish the task of reducing inflation to a 
satisfactory level if the political pressure associated with a high level of 
unemployment can be withstoodo However, it seems from this analysis that 
even a carefully regulated demand management policy in the future may not be 
sufficient to produce an early sixties inflation rate, unless the change in 
attitudes - for example, in real income expectations - induced by the £6 
a week policy are to some extent permanent. 
Section II 
The object of this section is to analyse the inflationary experience of 
the Scottish economy. First, the available data on inflation are set out. 
Secondly, a comparison is drawn between Scotland and the UK based on the 
view that although the causes of inflation in both countries are essentially 
similar there are important quantiative differences. The principal 
conclusions drawn in the section are, first, that the Scottish rate of price 
inflation was, and is, almost certainly greater than that for the UK, 
secondly, that the rate of inflation in Scotland is more sensitive to demand 
pressure, and thirdly that there is a particularly unfavourable short run 
trade-off between unemployment and inflation in Scotland. The consequences 
of unchecked inflation in the Scottish economy are discussed at the end of 
the article* 
The Rate of Inflation in Scotland 
It is possible to calculate a series for the rate of wage inflation in 
Scotland by using annual statistics on average weekly earnings. This series 
is set out in Table 4 and is plotted against the corresponding series for the 
whole of the UK in Graph 1. 
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Table 4 Unemployment and Increases in Average Weekly Earnings 
Year 
1960/61 
61/62 
62/63 
63/64 
64/65 
65/66 
66/67 
67/68 
68/69 
69/70 
70/71 
71/72 
72/73 
73/74 
Scotland 
10.3 
3.2 
5.3 
9.2 
9.0 
6.1 
6.1 
7.4 
8.1 
12.2 
10.5 
16.9 
15.5 
19.9 
% Unempl 
2.9 
3.5 
4.4 
3.5 
2.8 
2.7 
3.6 
3.7 
3.6 
4.1 
5.7 
6.2 
4.5 
3.9 
Sources: Scottish Economic Bulletin 
Economic Trends 
* 
The earnings figures are for full-time adult male manual workers 
One crucial point must be considered when comparing the UK figures 
with those for Scotland, namely, because the Scottish figures are 
included implicitly in the UK statistics the observed differences 
will be less extreme than those between Scotland and 'the rest of 
the UK'. Bearing this in mind, a number of points emerge from 
the data: 
(a) The average rate of wage inflation over the period from i960 
to 1974 was slightly higher in Scotland than it was in the UK as a 
whole. Average weekly earnings rose by 374% from 1960 to 1974 in 
Scotland as compared with 345% in the UK. It is not possible to 
calculate the differential between Scotland and the rest of the UK, 
but it is clearly more extreme. 
UK 
8.8 
3.4 
5.6 
8.1 
8.2 
3.6 
5.3 
7.6 
8.0 
13.0 
10.3 
15.8 
14.2 
18.8 
% unemployed 
1.7 
1.4 
1.5 
2.3 
2.4 
2.4 
2.6 
3.4 
3.7 
2.6 
2.6 
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(b) The qualitative fluctuations in the Scottish rate of wage 
inflation followed the UK pattern closely, but there were certain 
quantitative differences. 
(c) The divergence between the Scottish and UK figures was most 
marked in the 'boom' periods of 1965/66 and 1972/73. 
It is also valuable to examine the relationships between wage 
inflation and unemployment in Scotland and the UK. These are 
plotted for the period 1961-74 on graph (2) and show that there is 
a striking similarity between the patterns of data for the two countries: 
both reveal, wery roughly, a slanted 'V shaped scatter of points with 
the three observations for 1971-74 lying (in both cases) in a line 
above and to the right of the main group. As discussed in Section I 
there is of course no obvious downward sloping Phillips curve. The 
patterns of data that do emerge, while similar in shape, do not lie 
in the same regions of the graphs; in fact every point on the 
Scottish diagram lies 1| - 2% unemployment points to the right of the 
corresponding UK point. This has unfortunate implications for the 
Scottish economy that are examined later. 
While there are some small amounts of data on prices in Scotland - such 
as those published in a December report by the Price Commission, which 
stated that food prices in the north of Scotland were 7-8% higher 
than in central regions of the UK in May 1975 - there is no retail price 
index for Scotland, and this makes it impossible to provide a series 
for price inflation in Scotland that is comparable with that produced 
for the UK. However, it is almost certainly the case that the rate 
of price inflation has been, and is, higher in Scotland. As the 
average rate of wage inflation has been greater in the Scottish 
economy over the period, hence implying a faster increase in wage 
costs than in the rest of the UK, the rate of price inflation could 
only have been at or below the UK rate if some extremely unlikely 
combination of higher productivity increase and structural change has 
occurred in Scotland. Moreover, substantial excess demand in areas 
such as the North-East has produced areas of high regional wage and 
price inflation in the last few years as a result of oil development 
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and this must have recently provided a considerable stimulus to the 
Scottish rate of inflation. 
In conclusion, over the last fifteen years Scotland has experienced a 
higher level of wage inflation than the UK as a whole - the 
average level of earnings is now only slightly below the UK average -
and it seems certain that the same is true of the rate of price 
inflation. 
The Causes of Inflation in Scotland 
The first question in an analysis of the causes of Scottish wage and 
price inflation is whether the explanation given for inflation in the 
UK is applicable. In fact it seems reasonable to suggest that 
Scottish inflation can be attributed to the same broad causal 
factors. Thus Scottish inflation has been jointly produced by demand 
pressure and a wage-price spiral induced by inflationary expectations, 
and by the sociological and union bargaining power changes discussed 
earlier. Hence the scatter of points in diagram (2) conceals not 
only a short-run trade-off between wage inflation and unemployment 
but also the influence of the expected rate of inflation in Scotland, 
which is certainly mainly responsible for the rightward shift in the 
Phillips curve, and of other factors such as the role of wage claims 
based on 'parity' with the rest of the UK. The effect of substantial 
excess demand on wage inflation is illustrated most effectively by the 
behaviour of wages in the North-East over the last few years - an 
extreme example of the 'bidding-up' effect that excess demand creates. 
Although the causal mechanisms in Scotland are similar to those that 
produced the UK inflationary spiral it might be argued that these 
factors have somewhat different quantitative effects: for example, 
that unions are more militant in Scotland and better able to extract 
high wage increases, or that the expected growth in real incomes is 
lower in Scotland than in the rest of the UK - because of lower 
growth in the past, or that the role of wage parity with workers in 
England is the dominant 'sociological' influence on wage claims, 
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or that the expected rate of price inflation is perhaps higher in 
Scotland than in the whole country. Unfortunately no firm conclusions 
can be reached on whether these factors have produced the differences 
in inflation rates between Scotland and the UK; even so, they remain 
interesting possibilities. 
A Comparison between Scotland and the UK 
There are two important questions that must be considered in this 
discussion. The first is what caused the two main periods of 
divergence of the Scottish and UK wage inflation rates, while the 
second is why the scatter of Scottish points on the unemployment -
wage inflation diagram lies well to the right of those for the UK 
as a whole. 
First, as the periods of the greatest wage inflation differential 
were times of economic boom and high employment - at least in terms 
of the British trade cycle - it seems reasonable to conclude that 
the Scottish rate of wage increase is more responsive than the UK 
rate to demand expansion. The higher Scottish rate of wage inflation 
was particularly marked in the mid sixties boom (when UK unemployment 
was only \\%) at which time the rate of wage increase was more than 
6% while the UK figure was 3.6%. 
The second point stems from the observation noted earlier that the 
trade-off between inflation and unemployment - which the excess 
demand/expectations theorists suggest exists in the short run only, 
because workers start to adapt their wage claims as the price inflation 
resulting from the first wage increases begins to appear - is much more 
unfavourable in Scotland than in the nation as a whole. This means 
that to reduce wage inflation in Scotland requires a much higher level 
of unemployment than that necessary for the UK. On the causal 
assumptions stated throughout the article the possible reasons for 
this are that 
(a) the labour market in Scotland is comparatively inefficient at 
reallocating unemployed workers, perhaps because of the lack of 
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retraining facilities, the less varied selection of potential 
jobs and lower labour mobility than in the UK. 
(b) wages in the Scottish economy are heavily influenced by wages 
in the rest of the UK, because of 'parity' claims backed by union 
bargaining strength, so that while wages can rise faster in the 
face of excess demand, 'par' wages are only dampened by huge excess 
supply in the labour market. 
The policy implications of the two foregoing points are quite clear: 
while Scotland's inflation suffers rather more than the UK's from 
excess demand, much greater levels of unemployment in Scotland are 
required to reduce wage inflation. This implies that the Scottish 
economy is not only more prone to demand-led inflation, but also that 
it can get rid of it less easily than the UK as a whole by using 
deflationary methods. 
The Effect of the 'Internal' Exchange Rate 
Another point that has been made elsewhere stems from an argument 
proposed by the 'monetarists' to the effect that in an international 
system of fixed exchange rates, monetary expansion in one country 
eventually influences price inflation in the others. As Scotland 
effectively has a perfectly fixed exchange rate with the rest of the 
UK, any expansion or demand in England will tend to raise Scottish 
prices; a response which would not occur - so the argument runs -
if there were a freely floating exchange rate between the two 
currencies. However, this analysis ignores the fact that monetary 
expansion enacted by the Bank of England will be felt directly in 
Scotland as the Scottish clearing banks increase credit. Thus a 
floating rate of exchange would not in itself produce the desired 
effect; an independent Scottish monetary policy would also be 
necessary. 
The Consequences of Inflation 
As a major conclusion of this paper has been that particularly severe 
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unemployment would be necessary to reduce wage inflation in 
Scotland it is worth considering whether in fact it would be rather 
more advisable to accept the inevitability of some inflation. To 
examine this, the consequences of inflation, which are rarely 
discussed in detail, must be understood. First, the effect of a 
rate of price inflation in Scotland greater than that in the rest 
of the world is to decrease 'exports' to England and, unless the 
exchange rate depreciates, to the rest of the world. This will of 
course tend to depress output and employment in the Scottish economy 
over time. Secondly, inflation has undesirable redistributive 
effects: from lenders to borrowers, 'weak' unions to 'strong' 
unions, pensioners to wage earners and also (possibly) poor to rich 
if the former are less able to protect themselves from the effects 
of inflation. Thirdly, it seems quite reasonable to argue that 
investment in Scotland and elsewhere is reduced by the uncertainties 
and general lack of confidence inspired by inflation. Fourthly, and 
a barely considered consequence, a persistantly rising price level 
forces all firms to continuously raise prices, thus wasting time and 
resources on interminable price setting decisions, alterations of 
advertisements and price lists, and so on. Fifthly, a high rate of 
inflation produces a situation where consumers find it impossible to 
spend their incomes most effectively, because of the disorienting 
effects of continually changing prices. In conclusion, the welfare 
costs to society of high inflation are so severe as to merit even 
policy action that itself imposes a considerable cost on society, if in 
the long run inflation can be reduced to, and maintained at, a 
moderate rate. 
Conclusion 
In final summary, while the most effective inflation policy for both 
Scotland and the UK is one combining deflation with an incomes 
policy aimed at changing attitudes such as peoples expectations of real 
income growth, it seems from the analysis in this article that the 
unemployment necessary to achieve this in Scotland will be far higher 
than that required in the UK as a whole. Consideration of the costs 
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of inflation, however, suggests that such a policy may still be 
preferable to continuous inflation. Alternatively, for any given 
rate of money wage increase throughout the United Kingdom, 
productivity must rise relatively faster in Scotland if higher 
unemployment is to be avoided. 
% change in average earnings 
1960/61 61/62 62/63 63/64 64/65 65/66 66/67 67/68 68/69 69/70 70/71 71/7 
Rates of Change of Average Weekly Earnings : Scotland and the 
Source: Scottish Economic Bulletin 
Wage Inflation (%) Wage Inflation {%) 
• m 
1% 2% 3% n 5% 
Unemployment 
20 
18 
16 
14 
12 
10 
8 
6 
4 
2 
UNITED KINGDOM 
Wage In f la t ion and Unemployment in Scotland and the UK 1960-1974 
Vlo 2% 
Source: Scottish Economic Bulletin 
Economic Trends 
Table 1 Regional Unemployment in Scotland 
Highland 
Shetland 
Orkney 
Western Isles 
Grampian 
Tayside 
Fife 
Strathclyde 
Lothian 
Central 
Dumfries& Galloway 
Borders 
Unemployment 
Sep.75 
5o6 
3„0 
2,5 
17,9 
2,9 
5„3 
5o7 
7.1 
5ol 
5.7 
6.9 
3.3 
Rate {%) 
Dec.75 
6„8 
3,9 
2,7 
18,8 
3.2 
5.9 
5.7 
6,9 
4.9 
5.8 
8,1 
3.7 
% change 
Sep,75 Dec,75 
+21 
+30 
+ 8 
* 
+10 
+11 
0 
- 3 
- 4 
+ 2 
+17 
+12 
(seasonally 
adjusted) 
% change 
- 5,0 
+ 4.6 
-12.0 
-
+ 1,9 
+10.1 
+ 3,8 
+ 0,9 
- 1.7 
+ lo0 
+ 7,8 
+ 3.1 
Scotland 6,0 6,1 + 2 
Great Britain 5.2 5,1 - 2 
Source: Department of Employment 
Months not comparable due to boundary changes 
Table 2 (a) Unemployment/Vacancies 
December 
December 1971 
March 1972 
June 1972 
September 1972 
December 1972 
March 1973 
June 1973 
September 1973 
December 1973 
March 1974 
June 1974 
September 1974 
December 1974 
March 1975 
June 1975 
September 1975 
December 1975 
Ratio -
1971 - December 
Scotland 
17.1 
18.3 
12.0 
14,9 
10.1 
6.2 
3,9 
3.2 
2.9 
4.3 
2.7 
3.1 
-
4.7 
4.6 
6.8 
8.4 
1975 
Scotland and Great Britain 
Great Britain 
6.3 
5.9 
3.8 
4,1 
3.3 
2.2 
1.3 
1.1 
1.1 
1.7 
1.5 
2.1 
* 
4.3 
5.2 
8.5 
9.6 
* not available 
Source: Department of Employment Gazette 
Table 2 (b) Unemployment/Vacancies Ratio for the Regions of Great 
Britain at December 1975 
South East 
East Anglia 
South West 
West Midlands 
East Midlands 
Yorkshire & Humberside 
North West 
North 
Wales 
Scotland 
5.7 
8.4 
12.4 
18.1 
8.7 
11.7 
15.3 
12.4 
17.3 
8.4 
Source: Department of Employment 
Table 3 Industrial Employment and Unemployment in Scotland 
June 1974 - June 1975 
Employment ('000s) 
% Change % 
June 74 Sep 74 Dec 74 Mar 75 Jun 75 Jun 74 - June 75 
Total 
Males 
Females 
Agriculture, 
Forestry & Fishing 
Mining & quarrying 
Food, Drink & 
Tobacco 
Coal, Petroleum & 
Chemicals 
Metal Manufacture 
Engineering 
Textiles, Leather & 
Clothing 
Other Manufacturing 
Construction 
Gas, Electricity & 
Water 
Transport 
Distributive Trades 
Financial,Profess-
ional & other 
services 
Public Admin. & 
Defence 
2084 
1227 
8b7 
50.5 
33.9 
98.7 
30.6 
43.4 
286.4 
106.2 
110.9 
170.3 
28.4 
138.5 
242.1 
599.8 
141.6 
2087 
1228 
859 
49.7 
34.0 
98.6 
31.3 
43.8 
289.7 
106.1 
111.8 
169.6 
28.6 
138.9 
237.1 
601. y 
146.1 
2067 
1212 
855 
49.1 
34.1 
97.5 
31.4 
43.8 
286.6 
103.8 
108.1 
162.9 
28.7 
138.3 
242.1 
595.0 
146.0 
2040 
1201 
839 
44.6 
34.4 
95.2 
31.3 
44.3 
280.3 
100.1 
105.6 
160.6 
28.7 
139.8 
232.9 
593.3 
148.8 
2053 
1204 
849 
48.4 
34.1 
94.3 
31.6 
43.5 
276.4 
98.4 
101. b 
163.9 
28.9 
138.0 
235.2 
600.9 
157.4 
- 1.5 
- 1.9 
- U.9 
- 4.2 
+ 0.6 
- 4.5 
+ 3.3 
+ 0.2 
- 3.5 
- 7.3 
- 8.4 
- 3.8 
+ 1.8 
- 0.4 
- 2.8 
+ 0.2 
+11.2 
Source: Department of Employment Gazette 
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Figure 1 Rate of unemployment in Scotland and Great Br i ta in 
January 1972 - December 1975 
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Table 3 Industrial Employment and Unemployment in Scotl 
June 1974 - June 1975 
Employment ('000s) 
% Change 
June 74 Sep 74 Dec 74 Mar 75 Jun 75 Jun 74 - June 
Total 
Males 
Females 
Agriculture, 
Forestry & Fishing 
Mining & quarrying 
Food, Drink & 
Tobacco 
Coal, Petroleum & 
Chemicals 
Metal Manufacture 
Engineering 
Textiles, Leather & 
Clothing 
Other Manufacturing 
Construction 
Gas, Electricity & 
Water 
Transport 
Distributive Trades 
Financial.Profess-
ional & other 
services 
Public Admin. & 
Defence 
2084 
1227 
857 
50.5 
33.9 
98.7 
30.6 
43.4 
286.4 
106.2 
110.9 
170.3 
28.4 
138.5 
242.1 
599.8 
141.6 
2087 
1228 
859 
49.7 
34.0 
98.6 
31.3 
43.8 
289.7 
106.1 
111.8 
169.6 
28.6 
138.9 
237.1 
601. y 
146.1 
2067 
1212 
855 
49.1 
34.1 
97.5 
31.4 
43.8 
286.6 
103.8 
108.1 
162.9 
28.7 
138.3 
242.1 
595.0 
146.0 
2040 
1201 
839 
44.6 
34.4 
95.2 
31.3 
44.3 
280.3 
100.1 
105.6 
160.6 
28.7 
139.8 
232.9 
593.3 
148.8 
2053 
1204 
849 
48.4 
34.1 
94.3 
31.6 
43.5 
276.4 
98.4 
101.6 
163.9 
28.9 
138.0 
235.2 
600.9 
157.4 
1.5 
1,9 
0.9 
- 4.2 
+ 0.6 
- 4.5 
+ 3.3 
+ 0.2 
- 3.5 
- 7.3 
- 8.4 
- 3.8 
+ 1.8 
- 0.4 
- 2.8 
+ 0.2 
+11.2 
Source: Deoartment of Employment Ga7Pt>p 
Figure 4 Number of females unemployed in Scotland/Total unemployed in Scotland 
January 1968 - December 1975 
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